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Measuring Monetary Policy Interdependence∗
Abstract
This paper measures the degree of monetary policy interdependence between major industrialized
countries from a new perspective. The analysis uses a special data set on central bank issued policy
rate targets for 14 OECD countries. Methodologically, our approach is novel in that we separately
examine monetary interdependence due to (1) the coincidence in time of when policy actions are
executed from (2) the nature and magnitude of the policy adjustments made. The ﬁrst of these
elements requires that the timing of events be modeled with a dynamic discrete duration design. The
discrete nature of the policy rate adjustment process that characterizes the second element is captured
with an ordered response model. The results indicate there is signiﬁcant policy interdependence
among these 14 countries during the 1980-1998 sample period. This is especially true for a number
of European countries which appeared to respond to German policy during our sample period. A
number of other countries appeared to respond to U.S. policy, though this number is smaller than
that suggested in preceding studies. Moreover, the policy harmonization we ﬁnd appears to work
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This paper investigates the empirical regularities of monetary policy setting among a sample
of 14 industrialized countries, with special focus on the international interdependence among
these policies. A new empirical approach is proposed, which avoids the pitfalls implied by the
VAR approach that traditionally has been used to address this issue. This approach allows
us to look in a new way at the nature of policy coordination and the relative leadership roles
played by the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Bank of Japan, and the German Bundesbank.
International monetary policy coordination has become a subject of renewed interest of
late. In particular, Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2001) initiated a re-exploration of international
policy coordination using models with microeconomic foundations, representing a signiﬁcant
methodological departure from past literature. They conclude that in this context the wel-
fare gains of coordination are likely to be quantitatively small in comparison to the gains
from domestic stabilization policy. In rebuttal, subsequent theoretical work has suggested a
variety of economic features that could potentially generate greater motivation for nations to
coordinate their monetary policies. See for example, Benigno and Benigno (2001a,b), Can-
zoneri, Cumbi and Diba (2001), and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2001). Given this theoretical
controversy, it is natural to ask the empirical question of how much coordination we observe
in actuality.
There is a history of empirical research on this question. Studies focusing on the major
industrial countries generally ﬁnd evidence that the U.S. acts as a leader for policy makers in
certain countries, but the mechanisms through which this coordination takes place are often
unclear. (See Dominguez (1997), Furman and Leahy (1996), Chung (1993), Burdekin and
1Burkett (1992), Burdekin (1989), and Batten and Ott (1985).) Another branch has focused
on coordination among European countries, generally ﬁnding that Germany had a limited
leadership role among European countries prior to monetary union. (See Garcia-Herrero
and Thorton, 1996; Katsimbris and Miller, 1993; Biltoft and Boersch, 1992; Karfakis and
Moschos, 1990; and von Hagen and Fratianni, 1990a,b).
Our paper represents a signiﬁcant methodological departure from this preceding empir-
ical literature. We build upon the recently developed methodology of Hamilton and Jordá
(2002), which has been successfully employed to study monetary policy in the U.S. We extend
this methodology to a set of countries, and we explicitly allow for interdependence among
these national policies. Our approach is based on a novel data set on overnight, interbank
interest rate targets that central banks in our sample use to communicate and operationalize
monetary policy.
Methodologically, we ﬁrst argue against traditional time series techniques based on dy-
namical conditional correlations in semi-structural vector processes, which suﬀer from the
common identiﬁcation assumptions that mar the monetary vector autoregression (VAR) lit-
erature. Perhaps more importantly however, we show via Monte Carlo experimentation
that the peculiar statistical properties that policy rate targeting imbue on market interest
rates tend to severely distort these measures of association. In particular, these experiments
demonstrate that, for example, Granger causality tests often will misrepresent the true nature
of existing monetary policy linkages that are measured with market interest rate data.
These methodological pitfalls prompt us to pursue a more modest approach but which is
immune to the deﬁciencies described above. In particular, our goal is to determine whether
2G-3 policy moves help predict the timing of domestic policy adjustments and the direction
in which interest rates are modiﬁed, all conditional on domestic macroeconomic conditions.
Exploring these issues poses special econometric challenges that arise from the irregular
nature in which policy rate targets are adjusted over time as well as the discrete nature in
which these adjustments are made. Hence, we will use the autoregressive conditional hazard
(ACH) model proposed in Hamilton and Jordá (2002) to tackle the predictability in the
timing whereas a discrete ordered response model speciﬁcation will permit us to deal with
the discreteness of policy rate adjustments.
The empirical results are elucidating along several dimensions. First, our study can
be seen as a broad investigation of individual central bank behavior, and in this sense, it
provides important lessons to the literature that explores monetary policy rules. The special
nature of the data and the particulars of our empirical design suggest that Taylor type rules
do not universally describe monetary policy well, once the natural inertia of interest rates
and macroeconomic data has been ﬁltered. In particular, while U.S. policy responds to
inﬂation in a statically signiﬁcant manner, we were unable to ﬁnd similar evidence among
any of the other countries, including Germany, which traditionally enjoyed a reputation for
an aggressive stance against inﬂation. Further, while it is a current debate among monetary
theorists whether it is optimal for policy rules to include the exchange rate, we ﬁnd evidence
that this variable has in practice played a very prominent role in the policy rules of many
countries.
With regard to monetary policy interdependence, Germany emerges as a signiﬁcant fac-
tor for a block of European countries, in agreement with most past work. This indicates that
3policy interdependence existed among this European core long before the creation of the
explicit monetary union. Further this European interdependence entailed more than simply
responding to exchange rate movements, as required by the European Exchange Rate Mech-
anism (ERM), but appears to have involved direct responses by policy makers to changes in
German policy.
We also ﬁnd evidence that a limited number of countries respond to U.S. policy changes.
This list includes Germany and the UK, but in contrast to some past work, Japanese policy
does not appear to respond in a signiﬁcant way to the U.S.
2 Pitfalls of Interest-Rate Dynamic Correlations
It would be natural to explore the degree of monetary policy interdependence with vector
time series techniques using interest rate data on the countries in our sample, as is done in
Nogues and Grandes (2001), Bensidoun, Coudert, and Nayman (1997), and DeGennaro and
Kunkel (1994), for example. However, a large number of central banks in our sample opera-
tionalize monetary policy by targeting an overnight, interbank, interest rate. A consequence
of this modus operandus is that interest rates in these countries have unusual statistical
properties which make them unsuitable for conventional econometric analysis. This section
brieﬂy explains the nature of these problems with Monte Carlo experimentation and serves
to motivate the empirical design in the remainder of the paper.
Rudebusch (1995) demonstrated in a clever simulation that the manner the U.S. Federal
Reserve adjusts the federal funds rate target aﬀects the statistical properties of traditional
term structure regressions in a manner consistent with the poor results reported in that
4literature. We wish to extend Rudebusch’s (1995) arguments to show that central bank
interest-rate targeting behavior distorts conventional measures of dynamic covariation be-
tween interest rates of diﬀerent countries.
Let rA
t and rB
t denote the overnight rate in countries A and B, respectively. Although
central banks choose a target level for the overnight rate, they have only imperfect control
over it. Therefore, the overnight rate tends to ﬂuctuate around the target level. In the U.S.,
these deviations typically amount to only a few basis points and tend to be short lived (see
Hamilton (1996)). Accordingly, we model the overnight rate as,
ri
t = ri
t + εit εit ∼ N(0,σ2
i) i = A,B (1)
where ri
t denotes the target overnight rate. In practice, the residuals, εi, may be a general
stationary sequence but to keep the exercise simple, we will simulate them as i.i.d. normal
random variates. The variance of these residuals, σ2
i, is a natural measure of the central










t =1if the target is changed in period t, 0o t h e r w i s e ,a n dyi
t ∈{ k1,k 2,...,km}, reﬂect-
ing the fact that changes in the target are done in a small ﬁnite set of discrete increments.
Each period, there is some probability that the target will be changed, hi
t = P(xi
t =1 |Ωt−1),
which can be interpreted as a discrete time hazard. As usual, Ωt−1 represents the information
set up to time t − 1. Similarly, conditional on changing the target, the magnitude of the
5change, kj, can be described by,
P(yi
t = kj|xi
t =1 ,Ωt−1)=P(cj−1 <y i∗
t <c j|xi
t =1 ,Ωt−1) j =1 ,2,...,m (3)
with c0 = −∞,c m = ∞, and yi∗
t an auxiliary latent index that reﬂects the central bank’s
ideal for the overnight rate but which may be costly to attain in every single period. To
complete the simulation, we specify a simple bivariate model for hi
t that will capture the
coordination in the timing between countries A and B, and a bivariate model for ∆ri∗
t that
will capture coordination in the direction of the change instead. First, note that hi
t is a
probability, hence a convenient way of ensuring hi

























t, 0 otherwise, where ui
t is a uniform [0,1] random variable. The
bivariate speciﬁcation in (4) makes explicit two important features: (1) persistence in target
changes, which as we shall see in later sections, is a common feature in our data set, and (2)
policy setting in country A depends, via the parameter β, on country B’s policy setting. If
β>0, the likelihood of a target change in A increases with the likelihood of a target change
in country B, and vice versa. If β =0 , target setting occurs independently.
Similarly, to capture any coordination in the direction of changes in the target that may















t ∼ N(0,1) (5)
The parameters γi capture persistence in the direction of target changes, which is also a
commonly observed feature of the data, and the parameter ψ m a k e se x p l i c i tt h ec o r r e l a t i o n
in the direction in which the targets in countries A and B are changed. If ψ>0, countries
A and B tend to change their targets in the same direction and vice versa, if ψ =0 , there is
no relation.
The basic setup described in equations (1)-(5) establishes a well-deﬁned hierarchy: while
decisions on country B’s target are based completely on domestic information, country A’s
target timing and magnitude of changes depend on previous actions by country B whenever
β and ψ are non-zero. In other words, B Granger-causes A. Table 1 contains the results
of Monte-Carlo experiments in which simulated overnight rates are generated for diﬀerent
parameter values, using equations (1)-(5). For each combination of parameters, we generate
100 series of length 400, where the ﬁrst 100 observations are deleted to avoid initialization
problems. Then, on each of the series, we perform a standard Granger-causality test, collect
the p-value of all these tests and report the Monte-Carlo average. Figure 1 displays an
example of what these simulated interest rate series look like to show they closely resemble
the data in our study.
Several results deserve comment. The most immediately apparent is the extraordinary
sensitivity of the Granger-causality test. Even in the quasi-ideal scenario in which there is
7substantial coordination in the timing (β = 0.75) as well as coordination in the direction
(ψ =0 .75), Granger-causality tests will routinely fail to pick up these features whenever
the frequency with which the target is changed is relatively low (below 30% of the time)
and/or the central bank’s control of the overnight rate around the target is poor (σε > 0.25).
Other features of the model appear to be less important in determining this sensitivity except
perhaps the degree of persistence in the direction of the target changes (γA and γB small). It
is important to note that this failure of the Granger-causality test can occur under the most
favorable of situations, with high values of the parameters β,and ψ,with a relatively precisely
controlled overnight rate and with realistic parameters values. The Granger-causality test
metric appears to be well suited to capture directional coordination since it will detect this
type of coordination in the absence of coordination in the timing as long as the target is
changed suﬃciently often (40% of the time and above). However, even when the timing of
target changes is strongly related (β =0 .99), as the value of ψ decreases, even slightly (from
0.75 to 0.5 and below), the Granger-causality test will fail to pick the relationship.
These results are strongly suggestive that conventional econometric techniques are un-
suitable for the purposes of our analysis. Consequently, the remainder of the paper devises
an alternative empirical strategy which is based on the availability of an uncommon data
set, whose properties we discuss in the next section.
3 A Novel Data Set on Policy Rate Targets
A signiﬁcant aspect of our investigation on monetary policy linkages requires that we identify
the policy stance of each country in our sample. As we discussed in the previous section,
8it is often common to do this by isolating the exogenous component of a monetary policy
indicator based on a semi-structural VAR. However, in addition to the pitfalls discussed in
the previous section, these measures of the policy stance are problematic since they depend
on a number of untestable identifying assumptions and speciﬁcation choices that can produce
dramatically diﬀerent outcomes (for a discussion on these issues see Rudebusch, 1998; Sims,
1998; and Evans and Kuttner, 1998).
We prefer to avoid this controversy altogether by pursuing a radically diﬀerent approach.
In an exhaustive survey from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), entitled “Monetary
Policy Operating Procedures in Industrial Countries,” Claudio Borio1 (1997) provides an
in-depth discussion on central bank operations for 14 major industrialized OECD countries,
namely: Austria (AT), Australia (AU), Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Switzerland (CH),
Germany (DE), Spain (ES), France (FR), Italy (IT), Japan (JP), the Netherlands (NL),
Sweden (SE), the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US).
Table 2 reports the speciﬁc variables and samples available for each country while Figure
2 displays the policy target data along with the corresponding overnight interest rates. The
countries in our sample fall into two broad groups: (1) Australia, Canada, Japan and the
U.S. where the most representative policy variable is the overnight interbank rate; and (2)
Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, and
the U.K. in which the policy variable is usually a tender rate applicable mainly to repurchase
agreements (repos) and whose maturity varies from one day to one month. Along with these
data, we collected domestic macroeconomic data on inﬂation, output and exchange rates
1 We thank Greg Sutton and the Statistical Assistance Section of the Bank of International Settlements
for providing us the data.
9from the International Finance Statistics database produced by the I.M.F. The speciﬁcs for
these data are also reported in Table 2.
It is instructive at this point to take a ﬁrst look at our data. In particular, we ask whether
the probability that domestic target rates are changed, depends on whether similar changes
transpire in any of the G-3, regardless of the direction of the change. Thus, let xt =1if




t )￿ the vector of explanatory variables that consists on the similarly deﬁned x
variables for each of the G-3 countries. The per-period probability conditional on the actions
of the G-3 can be therefore be expressed as a discrete time hazard, ht = P(xt =1 |wt). A














Table 3 reports for each country the baseline hazard and the hazard whenever there is a
policy action in each of the corresponding G-3 targets. The data is organized at a monthly
frequency with the double purpose of matching, the timing and length of the maintenance
periods common in the countries that we consider, as well as the frequency at which our
explanatory variables are available in the analysis reported below. The latter allows direct
comparability with the results in Table 5.
10A cursory look at Table 3 reveals perhaps familiar results. For example, Austria changes
its target, on average, once every 10 months. However, if there is a change in the German
Lombard rate, the probability of a target change increases to a 1 in 2 chance for that month.
The eﬀect is more dramatic in Belgium (the baseline hazard is 17% but when Germany
adjusts, the hazard increases to 70%), France and the Netherlands. Notice that although
the eﬀect of German policy on the U.S. is statistically signiﬁcant, it only represents a 1%
increase in the probability that the U.S. will adjust the federal funds rate target that month.
By contrast, although the eﬀect in Spain is not signiﬁcant, the hazard increases by more than
10% from a baseline level of 38%. With respect to Japan, it appears it is only inﬂuential
with respect to German policy (the baseline is 48% but increases to 69% with a Japanese
move). The eﬀects of U.S. policy appear to aﬀect Austrian, Australian, Japanese and Dutch
policy but in every case the eﬀects are not particularly strong.
Several results deserve comment. First is the fact that these are estimates of probabilities
and therefore, highly nonlinear. Consequently, we have situations in which relations are
statistically signiﬁcant but economically weak (for example, the eﬀect of U.S. policy in Japan
causes the baseline to decline from 6% to 2%, hardly an economically meaningful eﬀect), and
vice versa, eﬀects that are economically noticeable but statistically weak (a move in Japanese
policy causes the Australian baseline to almost double from 18% to 32%). Two more caveats
to interpreting these results include (1) the eﬀects that obviously omitted variables may
have — domestic macroeconomic variables may explain away some of these relations or they
make others become signiﬁcant; and (2) the eﬀect that omitted dynamics may have on the
standard errors. Both of these issues are explored below.
11Summarizing, it is not surprising that Germany’s inﬂuence is felt in a list of countries
that has often been characterized as the “European core.” Italy’s absence from this list may
reﬂect the fact that our data sample for this country (September 1992 - November 1996) is
dominated by Italy’s absence from the EMS following the 1992 crisis. The U.S. inﬂuence does
not appear very strong, which is at this stage, a surprising result. Other speciﬁc countries
worthy of mention include Switzerland, whose measure of monetary policy is the ﬂexible
Lombard rate whereas in practice, the primary focus of the central bank is the volume of
giro deposits. Borio (1997) thus suggests that “[...] interest rates are of limited signiﬁcance
in conveying policy intentions.” (p. 17). Similarly, Japan is the only country that is still
using a quantitative signal as a key mechanism for steering an interest rate operating target.
Sweden uses a combination of a target for interest rate tenders with variable interest rate
auctions when markets ﬂuctuate around desirable levels (this mechanism is similar to that
used by the Bundesbank).
Although these results are suggestive, it is diﬃcult to discern at this point what motivates
these interconnections. Our approach in the following sections will be to try to describe each
central bank’s policy rule and choice of response timing. If, after controlling for responses to a
range of domestic macroeconomic factors, we are unable to control for the timing component,
we will conclude we have uncovered evidence of direct policy linkages. The next sections
discuss the econometric aspects of this strategy.
4 Measuring Monetary Policy Interdependence
The Monte Carlo experiments in Section 2 and the preliminary evidence in Section 3 already
provide a rough outline of the empirical strategy of the remainder of the paper. In particular,
12we will measure monetary policy interdependence along two dimensions. On one hand, we will
investigate to what extent the timing of policy rate adjustments is aﬀected by actions of the
G-3. On the other hand, we will examine whether domestic policy rate adjustments are made
in the same direction as adjustments in the G-3, all conditional on domestic macroeconomic
conditions. We begin by presenting the model speciﬁcation of the timing model.
4.1 The Timing of Policy Rate Adjustments
Predicting when a central bank will adjust its policy rate next can be conceived as a discrete-
time duration process, as we saw in the previous section in expression (6). However, unlike
that speciﬁcation, we wish to incorporate two new elements in the analysis: (1) adding
explanatory variables on domestic macroeconomic conditions, and (2) allowing for a general
dynamic speciﬁcation. The ﬁrst element is designed to rule out interdependence that is
mediated by synchronized business cycles and exchange rate considerations while the second
element is designed to account for serial dependence in target setting and to provide more
accurate standard errors.
There is substantial agreement in the literature that the manner central banks determine
the optimal level of their interest rate objectives can be well modelled by a Taylor rule (see
Taylor, 1999 for an extensive survey). This monetary policy rule establishes the dependence
of the policy instrument’s optimal level on deviations of inﬂation from a target (usually 2%
annual rate) and some measure of the output gap. In addition, small open economies also
include a term related to the exchange rate variability. Therefore, it seems natural to assume
that these variables would also determine the likelihood with which a central bank will decide
to adjust its policy rate in time.
13Based on this disquisition, we construct the following variables for each of the countries in
our sample: the inﬂation variable πt measured as the deviation of the annualized percentage
change in the consumer price index from a 2% norm; the output variable gt measured as the
deviation of the annualized percentage change in the industrial production index from a 2.5%
norm; and the exchange rate variable fxt measured as the monthly percentage change in the
nominal exchange rate weighted by the composition of each country’s trading partners. All
of these variables are added to the vector of explanatory variables wt deﬁned in Section 3 so




Several features of these variables deserve comment. First, to maintain the analysis at a
monthly frequency rather than quarterly (for which we would not have had suﬃcient degrees
of freedom), we had to compromise on the measures on the inﬂation and output variables
c o m m o n l yu s e de l s e w h e r ei nt h el i t e r a t u r e( t y p i c a l l yc o n s i s t i n go nt h eG D Pd e ﬂ a t o ra n dt h e
gap between GDP and some measure of potential GDP). Second, we preferred to avoid the
well-known and controversial issue of measuring the output gap by using instead deviations
from a 2.5% annual growth norm. Thirdly, these domestic macroeconomic variables are
lagged to reﬂect the information available to the central bank at the time of decision. The
ﬁnal tally of the speciﬁc variables and sources can be found in Table 2.
The ﬁnal element of the model’s speciﬁcation consists of endowing the process with
dynamics that account for possible serial dependence in the timing of domestic policy rate
adjustments. Hamilton and Jordá (2002) introduced the autoregressive conditional hazard
(ACH) model for this precise purpose in the context of U.S. monetary policy setting. Thus,
collecting all these elements together, the conditional probability that a country will adjust
14its policy rate at time t, p r e s e n t e di ne x p r e s s i o n( 6 ) ,c a nb ee x p a n d e di n t oan e wv e r s i o no f




λt = δ + αus(t−1) +βλt−1 + γ￿|wt|
and where us(t−1) denotes the amount of time elapsed between the two most recent policy
rate changes as of date t − 1, and where λt now becomes a dynamic latent index whose
structure is similar to that in an ARCH model. Notice that the explanatory variables wt
enter in absolute value since we are interested in the triggering mechanisms that prompt
the central bank to adjust the policy rate and hence, this is likely to occur whenever these
variables depart from above or from below their targeted values. We will call the version in
expression (8) ACH(1,1) to refer to the fact that one lag of each the duration and the latent
index enter the speciﬁcation. The expression for this ACH(1,1) can be easily generalized
to include longer lag lengths p and q and has the advantage of leaving the parameter space
unrestricted.
The sum of the coeﬃcients α and β provide a summary measure of the degree of serial
dependence in addition to allowing the eﬀect of the explanatory variables to be completely
dynamic but parsimonious. To see this, notice that the diﬀerence equation of the latent index
λt in expression (8) implies that the eﬀect of the terms in the vector wt is exponentially
decaying over time at a rate βt. The likelihood for the ACH model is the same as that in
expression (7), which can be maximized by conventional numerical techniques.
154.2 The Direction of Policy Adjustments
Conditional on the decision to adjust the policy rate, the central bank then needs to decide on
the nature and magnitude of this adjustment. This is typically done in discrete increments (of
25 basis points in the U.S., for example) rather than continuously and therefore, it is natural
to model this feature with a conventional ordered response model. Conditioning on xt =1
implies that the speciﬁcation of the model is in event time rather than in the usual calendar
time scale. This attribute has the considerable advantage of distilling demand ﬂuctuations
and other extraneous sources of variation from interest rate adjustments and into the actual
nature of the intended policy moves.
Denote the magnitude of the policy rate adjustment when it happens by ys. Since policy
rates are adjusted in discrete increments, we think of ys as taking a ﬁnite collection of values,
ys ∈{ k1,...,km} a n dw em a k en o t et h a tt h ei n d e xs refers to those periods in which xt =1
only. Therefore, the probabilistic model that determines the observation of the variable ys
can be written as
P(ys = kj|Ωs(t−1))=P(cj−1 <y ∗
s <c j|Ωs(t−1)) (9)
y∗
s = θ ws + εs εs ∼ N(0,1)
where y∗
s is a latent index, the thresholds cj,j=0 ,1,...,m are such that c0 = −∞,c j−1 <c j,
and cm = ∞. ws is the vector of explanatory variables deﬁned in the previous section
but where we replace the xi
t,i = DE,JP,US with yi




s ) . Ωs(t−1) denotes the information set available just before the
sth event.
16The parameter estimates of θ  are identiﬁed up to scale only, however, they are easily
interpretable. For example, a positive value of ￿ θDE would suggest that domestic rates are
more likely to be increased following a German increase and vice versa. The model in expres-
sion (9) has a well known likelihood function (see Maddala, 1983) which can be maximized
by conventional numerical techniques. Finally, we restrict the number of categories, kj, to
four to homogenize across the countries in our sample and to allow for better comparabil-
ity. Hence, the four categories can be loosely interpreted as: k1 = strong decrease, k2 =
decrease, k3 = increase, and k4 = strong increase.2 Table 4 reports for each country the
correspondence between this classiﬁcation system and the speciﬁc discrete changes of each
country. As an illustration, changes in the U.S. federal funds rate target correspond to
k1 = −0.50%,k 2 = −0.25%,k 3 =0 .25%, and k4 =0 .50%.
5 Results
5.1 The Timing Model
Table 5 displays the results of the ACH estimation of the timing model. For each country,
the label Constant refers to the baseline hazard assuming that inﬂation and output are at
their targeted levels (2% and 2.5%, respectively), that the exchange rate remained constant
during the previous month, and that none of the G-3 central banks modiﬁed their policy
rates during the month. The label Inﬂation refers to the hazard prevailing when inﬂation
deviates by 1% from its targeted value. A similar experiment describes the entries associated
with the labels Growth and Ex. Rate. The labels Germany, Japan, U.S. correspond to
2 The only exception to this reclassiﬁcation is Switzerland. Due to the large number of observed values, it
made more sense to proceed with a continuous model instead.
17the estimated hazards when these countries modify their policy rates that month. Finally,
because the parameters α, and β measure the degree of serial dependence in the timing data,
we preferred to report the parameter estimates and their standard errors directly.
A ﬁrst observation is that the standard Taylor rule variables, inﬂation and output growth,
do not apply equally well to all countries. While inﬂation is an important variable for U.S.
p o l i c y ,i td o e sn o ta p p e a ra ss i g n i ﬁ c a n tf o ra n yo ft h eo t h e rc o u n t r i e s . T h i si sp e r h a p s
most surprising for Germany, given its traditional reputation for an aggressive stance toward
inﬂation. Output growth is important for ﬁve of the countries, including Germany. Notably,
the exchange rate also is important for ﬁve countries. So while monetary theorists have cast
doubt on whether it is optimal to include the exchange rate in a country’s monetary policy
rule, our evidence suggests that quite a number of countries have done this in practice.
The next observation is that as in Table 3 previously, Table 5 shows a clear group of
countries in the European core which respond to German policy. Note that this is in addi-
tion to the fact that these countries also respond in a signiﬁcant manner to exchange rate
movements. This appears to indicate a long-standing degree of policy dependence in Europe,
one which is distinct from the demands of the ERM to respond to deviations in the exchange
rate. In contrast, for countries usually thought to be in the European periphery, such as
Spain and Italy, we do not discern a signiﬁcant response to German policy. Also, Sweden
and Switzerland, true to their reputations for independence, also appear to be independent
of foreign inﬂuence in their monetary policies. The United Kingdom is an interesting case,
in that the coeﬃcient on German policy is statistically signiﬁcant, but it is smaller than the
baseline value. This indicates that once we control for British responses aimed at stabilizing
18its exchange rate, British policy makers appear to be actually less likely to change domestic
monetary policy when the Germans have recently taken action.
Consider now the role of the U.S. While the U.S. does not respond to Germany, German
policy does respond to the U.S. One surprise, compared to previous literature, is that there is
not clear evidence that Japan responds to U.S. policy. The United Kingdom does respond to
the U.S., which is interesting, given that we found above that the U.K. does not respond in
a favorable way to German policy changes. It is worth noting that each of the relationships
with the U.S. listed above, inferred from the results in Table 5, is the opposite of that which
one would infer from Table 3. Apparently it is very important for judging the relationship
with the U.S. to account for the dynamics and Taylor rule variables, as is done for the results
reported in Table 5. This was not the case for the relationships with Germany reported
above; the core group of countries relating to Germany appears nearly the same in both
Tables 3 and 5.
Considering lastly the inﬂuence of Japanese policy, this plays a role only for Germany
and for Australia. It is interesting that Australian policy appears to have closer links to
its neighbor in Asia, than its culturally more similar but geographically more remote trade
partners in Europe and North America.
A ﬁnal word on these results pertains the dynamics captured by the ACH formulation.
These are particularly important for Austria, Switzerland, Germany, France, the Netherlands
and the U.K., where the sum α + β is, respectively: 0.81, 0.63, 0.84, 0.33, 0.45, and 0.67.
They are somewhat less relevant but signiﬁcant for Australia, Belgium, Japan, and the U.S.
where only α is signiﬁcant and attains the values 0.15, 0.09, 0.03, and 0.12 respectively. The
19only countries for which the dynamics are not relevant are Canada, Spain, Italy and Sweden,
although we have already remarked the lack of degrees of freedom for Canada and Sweden.
Overall, these numbers conﬁrm that accounting for serial correlation patterns in the data is
beneﬁcial for the majority of countries in our sample.
5.2 The Directional Model
Table 6 reports the ordered probit results, which directly display the coeﬃcient estimates of
the relevant parameters (along with the standard errors) since they are easily interpretable.
We begin by remarking that, although the sample sizes are generally quite small (this is due
to the fact that we conduct the analysis in event time and thus depend on the number of
actual policy adjustments made by each central bank), the coeﬃcients are rather precisely
estimated and the overall ﬁt of the models is quite good.
The estimates on the parameters of the domestic macroeconomic variables are generally
consistent with the typical behavior one would expect of central banks and embodied in a
typical Taylor rule. Inﬂation coeﬃcients are positive and signiﬁcant for Austria, Belgium,
Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Japan and the U.K., indicating that a rise in inﬂation above
the 2% target is tempered by an increase in the policy rate. Similarly, output deviations from
the 2.5% norm cause interest rates to increase although this eﬀect is measured signiﬁcantly
for Canada, Switzerland and the U.S. only. The exchange variable, which triggered central
bank responses in many of the countries in the timing model, is signiﬁcant for Canada,
Germany and the U.S. only.
What about the pattern of responses to the G-3? The timing model suggested that
Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands responded signiﬁcantly to the Bundesbank.
20The responses of the directional model are largely consistent with this view, with signiﬁcant
responses for Austria, Belgium, and France but in all cases of the correct sign: these countries
adjust interest rates at the same time and in the same direction as Germany.
Perhaps the only other pattern worth remarking is that of Australia. The timing model
suggests that Australia responded strongly to Japan (the baseline hazard goes from 86% to
97%). The directional model also shows a strong response to Japan but in this case, it is in
the direction of moving interest rates against the Bank of Japan.
5.3 Robustness — The Role of Formal Agreements
The empirical experiments in the previous section demonstrate that there is a substantial
amount of monetary policy interdependence. The relations existing between Germany and
Austria, Belgium, France and the Netherlands are likely to be a direct result of the formal
ties that the European Monetary System (EMS) represented, now the European Monetary
Union. By the same token, Italy’s apparent lack of relation may be explained by its absence
from the EMS from September 1992 to November 1996. Incidentally, the 1992 crisis in
the EMS signiﬁcantly aﬀected Sweden although the sample available for this country only
starts after 1994, well past this juncture. One may suspect that this particular episode may
also adversely aﬀect the results reported in the previous section. However, our methods are
unaﬀected by this crisis since the logical consistency of our approach relies instead on the
responsiveness of central banks in terms of timing and direction of adjustments made — an
issue that would be clearly problematic had we taken the approach of using some measure of
dynamic covariation. Nevertheless, to highlight that our results are not sensitive to the 1992
crisis, we experimented with a sample truncated in 1994. These experiments were broadly
21consistent with our ﬁndings in the previous section and therefore are not reported here to
save space.
There is yet another dimension in which we experiment with the robustness of our ﬁnd-
ings. Interesting work by Dominguez (1997) explores the inﬂuence of formal international
agreements. Dominguez (1997) studied the communiques produced from meetings of the G7,
G-5 and G3 dating from 1975 to 1993, and identiﬁed when there was a call for a coordinated
eﬀort to reduce inﬂation or lower interest rates. Commitments to ﬁght inﬂation coincide
with periods where actual inﬂation is rather high, beginning with the ﬁrst summit in 1975
through the London Summit in 1984, and again from mid 1988 to April 1989. The focus
shifted to economic growth and commitments to lower interest rates in 1986, 1987, 1991 and
1992. Overall, Dominguez identiﬁes in the sample ﬁfteen cases of commitments to lower
inﬂation and nineteen commitments to lower interest rates.
We experimented with the dates reported in Dominguez’s (1997) study for the G-5 coun-
tries, namely Germany, France, Japan, the U.K., and the U.S. This choice is primarily
m o t i v a t e db yt h el e n g t ho ft h ea v a i l a b l es a m p l e sf o rt h e s ec o u n t r i e sa n dt h eo v e r l a pw i t ht h e
Dominguez (1997) sample. We speciﬁed complete timing models that included the domestic
macroeconomic variables, the G-3 timing variables, a G5/G7 meeting dummy if that month
corresponded to a meeting reported in Dominguez (1997), and the ACH dynamics. Rather
than reporting a new table of estimates, we computed the baseline hazard and the hazard
computed with the dummy variable for the G-5/G-7 meetings. The baselines for Germany,
France, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. are 62%, 4%, 62%, 43%, and 70%, respectively. The
G5/G-7 meeting dummy was not signiﬁcant for any country except for Japan. The corre-
22sponding values for these hazards are 60%, 2%, 25%, 50%, and 67% — virtually identical to
the baselines except for Japan, where a month in which a G-5/G-7 meeting takes place is
usually a month in which the Bank of Japan is half as likely to adjust its policy rate.
6 Implications
The contributions of this paper span in several dimensions. At a methodological level, we
demonstrated that interest rate targeting modiﬁes the time series properties of market inter-
est rate data in a manner that renders traditional vector time series techniques inapplicable.
Our Monte Carlo evidence complements the results reported in Rudebusch (1995) regarding
the eﬀects of interest rate targeting on term structure regressions.
The solution we propose to this problem is based on an uncommon data set on policy
rate target data and consists on decomposing central bank policy into the decision to adjust
versus the actual type of adjustment. This strategy is based on previous work by Hamilton
and Jordà (2002) for the U.S. and is modiﬁed and used here for the ﬁrst time on other
countries to detect monetary policy interdependence.
This empirical design has several advantages that go beyond the econometric pitfalls
discussed early on. In particular, recent research by Rudebusch (2002) and Van Gaasbeck
(2002) suggest that Taylor rules may appear to accurately describe central bank behavior
due to the inherent persistence in macroeconomic data. We completely dispense with this
artifact by concentrating instead on the snap shots that target rate adjustments provide of
actual central bank policy. Hence, our results are elucidating, not only with regard to the
issue of monetary policy linkages, but also as an alternative analysis of domestic monetary
policy in industrialized OECD countries.
23We ﬁnd evidence of a clear European core, that responded to German policy long before
the creation of a formal monetary union. Further this interdependence seems to have in-
volved more than just attempts to stabilize exchange rates, but instead involved more direct
responses to German policy shifts. We also ﬁnd evidence of a distinct European periphery,
including Italy, Switzerland and the UK, which did not respond to German policy. Finally,
some countries respond to U.S. policy shifts, notably Germany and the UK. But we did not
ﬁnd any evidence that Japan responds to the U.S. Our results also shed light on the debate
whether countries should include the exchange rate in their policy rules — quite a number of
countries in practice do assign a very prominent weight on this variable.
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Table 1 – Monte-Carlo Experiments




























B =0 . 5 ,γ
A = γ
B =0 . 5 ,σ A = σ B = 0.25,
Changing the Correlation in the Timing – Directional Correlation ψ = 0.75






0.25 0.0392 0.6638 0.403
0.5 0.0410 0.6553 0.402
0.75 0.0408 0.6488 0.401
0.99 0.0427 0.6453 0.401
Note: ρ
A = ρ
B =0 . 5 ,γ
A = γ
B =0 . 5 ,σ A = σ B = 0.25, Empirical Frequency for B = 0.400
Changing the Variance of the Errors around the Target - β = 0.99, ψ = 0.99







B =0 . 5 ,γ
A = γ
B =0 . 5 ,σ A = σ B = 0.25, Empirical Frequency for A = 0.400, B = 0.40028
Table 1 (Contd.)
Changing the Autocorrelation of the Timing Process – β = 0.75, ψ = 0.75








0.9 0.1227 0.5967 0.332 0.302
0.75 0.1304 0.6117 0.306 0.301
0.5 0.1231 0.6270 0.304 0.301
0.25 0.1225 0.6282 0.303 0.301
0 0.1325 0.6215 0.303 0.301
Note: γ
A = γ
B =0 . 5 ,σ A = σ B = 0.25.
Changing the Autocorrelation of the Directional Process - β = 0.75, ψ = 0.75
γ
A = γ








B =0 . 5 ,σ A = σ B = 0.25, Empirical Frequency for A = 0.303, B = 0.301
Equations of the Monte Carlo Simulation
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with m = 5, k1 = -0.50; k2 = -0.25; k3 = 0.25; k4 = 0.50; and c1 =- ∞ ;c 2 = -.75; c3 =0 ;c 4
= 0.75; c5 = ∞
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Table 2 – Summary of the Data Definitions
COUNTRY Operational Monetary Data Codes Sample
Begins Macro-International Data Freq.
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Netherlands
Call money
Rate on special advances
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U.S. Federal funds rate





I P ,C P I ,N E E R M
Note: Target rates in bold and italic. NEER is the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, IP is the Industrial
Production Index, CPI is the Consumer Price Index30
Table 3 – Hazard Rates for Policy Rate Adjustments as a Function of Adjustments in
Germany, Japan and the U.S.
Austria Australia Belgium Canada Switz. Germany Spain
Baseline 0.12** 0.18** 0.17** 0.44 0.83** 0.48 0.38*
Germany 0.53** 0.14 0.70** 0.53 0.90 0.48 0.49
Japan 0.04* 0.32 0.13 0.99 0.87 0.69* 0.23
U.S. 0.06* 0.30* 0.29 0.65 0.88 0.58 0.44
Obs. 111 98 89 48 111 150 94
France Italy Japan Nether. Sweden U.K. U.S.
Baseline 0.25** 0.27** 0.06** 0.35** 0.41 0.35** 0.38**
Germany 0.42** 0.33 0.22 0.73** 0.55 0.26 0.37*
Japan 0.16 0.28 0.06** 0.47 0.36 0.27 0.35
U.S. 0.25 0.23 0.02** 0.25* 0.48 0.46 0.38**
Obs. 118 91 144 150 48 147 150
Comments:
•  Baseline: measures the probability that in any given month, the corresponding
country’s policy rate will be adjusted.
•  Germany: measures the probability of a domestic adjustment when Germany
adjusted its policy rate that month.
•  Japan: measures the probability of domestic adjustment when Japan adjusted its
policy rate that month.
•  U.S.: measures the probability of adjustment when U.S. adjusted its policy rate
that month.
•  */** indicates significant at the 90%/95% confidence level.31
Table 4 – Classification of Target Changes
Country k1 = strong
decrease
k2 = decrease k3 =i n c r e a s e k 4 = strong
increase
Australia 75 . 0 − < ∆ t r 0 75 . 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ − t r 75 . 0 0 ≤ ∆ < t r t r ∆ >0 . 7 5
Austria 5 . 0 − < ∆ t r 0 5 . 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ − t r 0< t r ∆≤ 0.5 t r ∆ >0 . 5
Belgium 5 . 0 − < ∆ t r 0 5 . 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ − t r 0< t r ∆≤ 0.5 t r ∆ >0 . 5
Canada 5 . 0 − ≤ ∆ t r 0 5 . 0 ≤ ∆ < − t r 0< t r ∆ <0 . 5 t r ∆≥ 0.5
France 4 . 0 − ≤ ∆ t r 0 4 . 0 ≤ ∆ < − t r 0< t r ∆≤ 0.4 t r ∆ >0 . 4
Germany 4 . 0 − ≤ ∆ t r 0 4 . 0 ≤ ∆ < − t r 0< t r ∆≤ 0.4 t r ∆ >0 . 4
Italy 5 . 0 − < ∆ t r 0 5 . 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ − t r 0< t r ∆≤ 0.5 t r ∆ >0 . 5
Japan 5 . 0 − < ∆ t r 0 5 . 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ − t r 0< t r ∆≤ 0.5 t r ∆ >0 . 5
Netherlands 4 . 0 − ≤ ∆ t r 0 4 . 0 ≤ ∆ < − t r 0< t r ∆≤ 0.4 t r ∆ >0 . 4
Spain 5 . 0 − < ∆ t r 0 5 . 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ − t r 0< t r ∆≤ 0.5 t r ∆ >0 . 5
Sweden 3 . 0 − ≤ ∆ t r 0 3 . 0 ≤ ∆ < − t r 0< t r ∆ <0 . 3 t r ∆≥ 0.3
U.K. 5 . 0 − < ∆ t r 0 5 . 0 ≤ ∆ ≤ − t r 0< t r ∆≤ 0.5 t r ∆ >0 . 5
U.S. 5 . 0 − ≤ ∆ t r 0 5 . 0 ≤ ∆ < − t r 0< t r ∆ <0 . 5 t r ∆≥ 0.532
Table 5 – ACH Estimates: The Timing Model
Austria Australia Belgium Canada Switz. Germany Spain
Constant 0.001** 0.86* 0.11** 0.45 0.79 0.05** 0.52
Inflation 0.001 0.85 0.08 0.58 0.86 0.06 0.47
Growth 0.002 0.65** 0.12 0.38 0.81 0.07** 0.51
Ex. Rate 0.99** 0.74 0.78** 0.39 0.31 0.69 0.68
Germany 0.10* 0.55** 0.58** 0.77* 0.82 0.05** 0.65
Japan 0.001 0.97** 0.09 0.45 0.99 0.65* 0.42





















OBS. 99 86 77 36 99 138 83
Log-Lik. -44.51 -34.44 -35.89 -23.03 -37.74 -75.17 -54.52
France Italy Japan Nether. Sweden U.K. U.S.
Constant 0.54 0.14 0.10** 0.05** 0.55 0.09* 0.38
Inflation 0.24** 0.15 0.06 0.05 0.61 0.09 0.54**
Growth 0.50 0.16** 0.10 0.05 0.49* 0.11* 0.36
Ex. Rate 0.72 0.18 0.16* 0.99** 0.49 0.36* 0.31
Germany 0.76* 0.14 0.33** 0.52** 0.60 0.02** 0.27
Japan 0.26 0.14 0.10** 0.07 0.55 0.01 0.24



















OBS. 106 79 132 138 36 135 138
Log-Lik. -61.31 -45.21 -39.40 -73.08 -23.15 -79.07 -79.16
Notes: Constant refers to the baseline hazard; Inflation, Growth, Ex. Rate refer to the
hazard when there is a 1% deviation in the corresponding variable from its norm;
Germany, Japan, U.S. refer to the hazard when the corresponding G-3 bank adjusts its
policy rate that month; α ,β are the actual coefficient estimates from the ACH (standard
errors in parenthesis); */** indicates significant at the 90/95% confidence level; OBS. Is
the number of observations, which differ from those reported in Table 3 because we loose
the first 12 observations to compute annual growth rates of the explanatory variables;
Log-Lik is the log-likelihood value.33
Table 6 – Ordered Probit Estimates







































































Log. Lik. -9.65 -4.72 -12.22 -22.06 67.71 -54.90 -5.22
Pseudo R
2 0.48 0.57 0.59 0.29 0.89 0.25 0.80
Obs. 28 16 35 23 72 75 35



























































Log. Lik. -6.82 -6.33 -53.49 -10.24 -28.14 -69.74
Pseudo R
2 0.77 0.51 0.29 0.12 0.47 0.17
Obs. 36 13 72 14 43 64
Note: */** indicates significant at a 90/95% confidence level. Standard Errors in
parenthesis. † Switzerland’s model estimated by OLS due to the large variation in policy
adjustments. There were not enough observations on Italy to estimate a viable model.34














•  p-value B Granger-causes A = 0.1231 for this example
•  Timing Model Parameters:
75 . 0 ; 5 . 0 = = = β ρ ρ B A
•  Directional Model Parameters:
75 . 0 ; 5 . 0 = = = ϕ γ γ B A
•  Timing Frequency = 0.335



















































































Note: Whenever target rates and overnight rates are indistinguishable, we use dual scales
for clarity.36





































































































































Note: Whenever target rates and overnight rates are indistinguishable, we use dual scales
for clarity.